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ABSTRACT
As users increasingly rely on online social networks for their communication activi-
ties, personal location data processing through such networks poses significant risks
to users’ privacy. Location tracks can be mined with other shared information to
extract rich personal profiles. To protect users’ privacy, online social networks face
the challenge of ensuring transparent communication to users of how their data are
processed, and explicitly obtaining users’ informed consent for the use of this data.
In this paper, we explore the complex nature of the location disclosure problem and
its risks to personal privacy. We evaluate, with an experiment involving 715 partic-
ipants, the contributing factors to the perception of such risks with scenarios that
mimic a) realistic modes of interaction, where users are not fully aware of the extent
of their location-related data being processed, and b) with devised scenarios that
deliberately inform users of the data they are sharing and its visibility to others. The
results are used to represent the users’ perception of privacy risks when sharing their
location information online and to derive a possible model of privacy risks associated
with this sharing behaviour. Such a model can inform the design of privacy-aware
online social networks to improve users’ trust and to ensure compliance with legal
frameworks for personal privacy.
KEYWORDS
Location privacy; Privacy models; Geosocial networks
1. Introduction
As users rely more and more on online social networking applications for their com-
munication activities, the processing of personal location data through such networks
increasingly poses significant risks to the security and privacy of users. Such risks stem
mainly from the variety of personal identifying data held by these networks and the
extended possibility of tracking and profiling users based on their location information.
The processing of personal data through such networks is not always transparent to
or controllable by the users. On the other hand, the importance of security and pri-
vacy of users’ data is increasingly being recognised as a challenge to online and mobile
applications, as evidenced by the recent personal data leak involving millions of Face-
book users (BBC 2018). Also, legal frameworks are emerging that include protection
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mechanisms to allow individuals to better control their personal data. In particular,
the General Data Protection Regulation (EU) 670/2016 (GDPR) (EUR-Lex 2018),
now in place throughout European Union (EU) countries, stipulates data protection
principles and privacy requirements that need to be fulfilled by such applications. To
ensure compliance with these legal requirements, privacy awareness methods need to
be incorporated into the design of online social networks.
In this work we focus in particular on the processing of personal location data on
online social networks. In some types of these networks, denoted location-based social
networks, users’ interaction is mainly guided by their presence in geographic places, e.g.
checkins on Foursquare. Processing of location information is essential for the provision
of services by these applications. On other networks, denoted location-enabled social
networks, location is a complementary attribute that can be used to enhance the
user experience, e.g. filtering geo-tagged tweets by place on Twitter. Collection and
processing of user location information in both cases can result in user profiling and
derivation of sensitive information, revealing patterns of presence at home, regularly
visited places and frequent activities, and even racial or ethnic origins. For convenience,
in the rest of this paper both types of online social networks will be referred to as Geo-
Social Networks (GeoSNs).
To comply with legal frameworks and data protection principles, GeoSNs need to
observe the transparency of user data processing and the informed consent of their
users for such data processing. In particular, Article 5 of the GDPR stipulates that with
respect to transparency, “any processing of personal data should be lawful and fair.
It should be transparent to natural persons that personal data concerning them are
collected, used, consulted or otherwise processed and to what extent the personal data
are or will be processed ... communication relating to the processing of those personal
data be easily accessible and easy to understand ...”, whilst Article 7 indicates that
processing is based on the freely given and informed consent by the user.
Previous user studies highlighted the privacy awareness gap, where users are not
fully aware of risks to their personal privacy resulting from their sharing information
online (Keßler and McKenzie 2018, Coppens et al. 2014). In this paper, we consider
the factors that contribute to privacy risks on GeoSNs and pay particular attention
to users’ awareness of their sharing behaviour when interacting on these networks.
Configuring (and updating) personal privacy settings on GeoSNs can be cumber-
some, leading to possible divergence between users’ sharing choices and previously
specified sharing polices (Patil et al. 2014). Research is emerging that studies mecha-
nisms for providing feedback to help raise user awareness of potential inconsistencies
with default preferences (Tsai et al. 2009), which mainly relies on exposing how often
they access privacy settings and encouraging them to revise their preferences actively.
With the continuous accumulation of location tracks, constructing useable feedback
becomes a challenge (Patil et al. 2014).
In this work we explore the problem of improving users’ awareness of their location
sharing behaviour and propose a model of privacy risks that is derived from studying
the collective attitude of users towards sharing data on GeoSNs. The model can be used
to detect vulnerable sharing scenarios and to inform the design of effective feedback
notices in GeoSNs.
After analysing the types of information that are collected and mined on GeoSNs,
we consider the following questions in the context of sharing location information.
(1) Does user awareness of the data they share and the possible processing or analysis
that can be done over their data on GeoSNs affect their perception of personal
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privacy? An experiment, involving 715 participants, is designed to gauge users’
perception of risk when considering the data and its visibility to others in the
context of different modes of users’ awareness on GeoSNs.
(2) Can the users’ perception of risk to personal privacy be modelled? The results
from the experiment are used to devise a model of risk to personal privacy when
sharing location information on GeoSNs. The model utilises users’ willingness
to share their data in different contexts to devise a measure of vulnerability in
different sharing scenarios. A simple visualization of this vulnerability index is
proposed to assist the user in understanding the level of risk to their personal
privacy associated with their sharing behaviour.
The contribution of this work is twofold: first, we demonstrate that transparency of
location data processing in GeoSNs can significantly impact users’ perception of risk
to their personal privacy; second, we propose a model of privacy risk on GeoSNs
that is based on users’ attitude to sharing their location. The paper starts in section
2 with a review of related works on user profiling from location tracks and users’
privacy perception on online social networks and its implication. The dimensions of
the location disclosure problem are examined in section 3. In section 4, the design
of the experiment is presented and justified. Results that demonstrate the impact of
the different contributing factors to privacy perception are analysed in section 5. In
section 6, a model of risk to location privacy is proposed using the results obtained
and a discussion of its utility within a privacy-aware GeoSN is presented, followed by
conclusions in section 7.
2. Related work
An overview of research into user profiling using data collected from GeoSNs is given
to highlight the range of information that can be extracted from this data. Studies on
understanding users’ perception of privacy on GeoSNs are reviewed, followed by an
overview of current research efforts on designing privacy-aware systems.
2.1. User Profiling on GeoSNs
Understanding users from their location data collected on GeoSNs is an active area of
research. Several studies considered the accurate identification of users’ location from
their GPS trails (Pontes et al. 2012, Bellatti et al. 2017). Using the user’s profile of
visited places and socio-historical ties, accurate prediction of future check-in informa-
tion (Gao et al. 2012) and identification of user’s home location (Gu et al. 2016) were
demonstrated. Other works investigated the potential inference of social relationships
between users of GeoSNs. For instance, users’ co-occurrence in place, as extracted
from geo-tagged Flickr photos, was sufficient for deducing, with high probability, the
nature of their social ties and friendship links (Sadilek et al. 2012).
Recently, several research works examined the problem of extracting spatiotemporal
movement and activity patterns of users on GeoSNs, for the purpose of understanding
users and places. Mobility patterns on Foursquare were studied to identify popular
places and to detect transition patterns between place categories (Noulas et al. 2011),
while the distance between consecutive check-ins of users was used to compute their
returning probability to venues (Preotiuc-Pietro and Cohn 2013). Kurashima et al.
in (2013) demonstrated how geo-tagged content on Flickr can be used to understand
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landmarks, topics of interest and active geographic regions of importance to the user
and hence can recommend suitable travel routes.
With regards to understanding users, sensitive personal information can be revealed
by tracking the user check-in information, including, gender, educational background,
age and sexual orientation (Rossi and Musolesi 2014, Zhong et al. 2015). Liu et al.
in (2018) summarise different modes of attack that can be used by adversaries on a
mobile application to reveal the user’s identity and to determine their position and time
information, including machine learning methods (Murakami and Watanabe 2016)
and collusion of malicious users. In this work, an adversary is any entity (person or
organisation) that illegitimately (without the user’s awareness or permission) seeks
to collect user’s data, whether for a useful purpose, e.g. making recommendations,
or otherwise, e.g. stealing the user’s identity. These can include the service provider,
third parties or the user’s friends.
2.2. Privacy Perceptions on GeoSNs: The privacy Awareness Gap
Early studies on Location-Based Services (LBS) showed that users were generally
anxious about their privacy (Fisher et al. 2012) and will seek to manage it by deleting
social connections, comments or by removing applications (Boyles and Smith 2012,
Alrayes and Abdelmoty 2014). A study of Facebook users found that the amount
of publicly displayed data decreases with time as users restrict the visibility of their
profiles (Stutzman et al. 2013). Users tended to be more conservative with their sharing
behaviour, selecting the most effective obfuscation methods, when they became aware
of their location history
Although concerns about location privacy are evident, users will still share location
information, driven in many cases by small rewards and incentives; a phenomenon
known as the Privacy Paradox. An explanation of the inconsistency of privacy attitudes
and privacy behaviour is an active area of research that requires in-depth study as
noted in (Kokolakis 2017).
Methods to address the apparent gap between users’ privacy awareness and the
extent to which they share data are being proposed that try to assist users by learning
their attitudes towards privacy. This can be achieved by directly asking users (Watson
et al. 2015) or automatically by learning from the users’ interaction behaviour and
settings (Bilogrevic et al. 2016). Here we propose to model users’ perceived privacy
risks when disclosing location on GeoSNs and use this model within feedback tools to
improve users’ awareness.
2.3. Privacy models and frameworks
Privacy models provide principles and guidelines to be considered when designing a
privacy-aware system. They present insights into how to design a system that serves
users’ awareness of potential privacy implications based on their interaction with it,
and suggest means of effective privacy management by users. These models have com-
mon aspects, but can vary based on the application and privacy domains. A pioneering
privacy model was introduced by Bellotti and Sellen in (1993), who proposed that the
drivers of the design of a system should be the provision of feedback for and con-
trol of several aspects of information, including, information collection, processing,
accessibility, and purpose of use. Their framework also identifies design criteria to
help in evaluating design solutions. Adams and Sasse (1999) suggested three main
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factors which help to define the boundaries under which a privacy breach can take
place, namely, data sensitivity, information receiver, and information purpose of use.
The importance of keeping the user informed of their information, disclosing actions
through usable feedback, and providing the means to control privacy settings were
advocated in several works (Langheinrich 2001, Friedman et al. 2005).
Shokri et al. in (2010) were the first to publish a unified framework of loca-
tion privacy. Their review describes various location privacy preservation mechanisms
(LPPMs) and compares metrics for measuring location privacy. The review was ex-
tended in (Liu et al. 2018) with a study of possible attack categories and location
privacy metrics.
The above works examined how different aspects of location information can lead
to potential privacy threats and some reviewed the efficacy of protection mechanisms
to protect users against those threats. In this paper, we also consider the factors that
contribute to privacy risks in GeoSNs but pay particular attention to users’ awareness
when interacting and sharing their information on these networks.
3. Dimensions of the Location Disclosure Problem
In this section we consider the factors that contribute to users’ perception of risk to
their personal privacy while interacting on GeoSNs. As the user’s location footprints
are accumulated over time, they become a rich source of information on the character-
istics of the user as well as the places he visits. Whether this data is visible to others,
and whether the user is aware of the extent of the information he is sharing, are factors
that can influence his perception of personal privacy.
3.1. The Data Dimensions
The data dimensions comprise a group of three different dimensions that represent the
different attributes of the data collected on GeoSNs, as follows.
(1) The spatial dimension (which places is the person visiting?)
(2) The socio-semantic dimension (what is the person doing in these places and with
whom is he or she interacting?)
(3) The temporal dimension (when are these activities taking place?)
Separating the dimensions help to distinguish between physical location and behaviour,
which may not always be linked in a directly observable way (for example, a user
may be in a coffee shop, but working remotely rather than socialising). The type of
data and the amount of data collected determine the kind of information that can be
inferred and stored in the user profile. Hence, it is useful to study how the individual’s
perception of risk to personal privacy differ along these three dimensions.
(1) The Spatial Dimension
Presence of the user in a place is plotted on the spatial dimension. A track
of user mobility in space is collected as a sequence of time-stamped geographic
coordinates which can be reverse geo-coded to automatically detect the user’s
presence in specific places. In addition, the user may also indicate his presence in
the place (e.g. by explicitly checking in). The latter case allows users to describe
places of interest that are not digitised or identified on a general map.
(2) The Socio-semantic Dimension
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This is a compound dimension and comprises two distinct aspects: a) explicit
social links to other users, and b) shared content. Explicit links to other users,
for example as friends or followers, is an orthogonal dimension to both the spatial
and temporal dimensions. Here social ties are formed and maintained between
users independently of their presence in geographic locations.
Shared content on GeoSNs refers to the different types of data provided by the
users. This could include text (in a variety of forms such as tags, tips, reviews
and tweets), images or videos. As is the case for social ties, content may be
explicitly attached to a place visited, e.g. writing a tip when visiting a restaurant
or tweeting about a music festival whilst attending it. Alternatively, the location
may be independent of the shared content, e.g. tweeting about the release of a
new album of a favourite artist whilst at home. Different semantic information
concerning the user and their association with places can be extracted from the
shared content. This could include the user’s interests, activities and sentiments
(Mohamed and Abdelmoty 2017).
(3) The Temporal Dimension
The temporal dimension gives a timeline of the user’s visits to different places.
The frequency of visits to geographic locations can be used as an indicator of
the degree of association with the locations and with the related activities and
concepts derived from the socio-semantic dimension. Clustering specific temporal
intervals on the timeline can be made to study emerging patterns of user activity.
Regarding the spatial dimension, the sensitivity of a place is an important factor
when considering privacy perception. Sensitivity of a place is an attribute that is linked
to the type of information it reveals about the individual. For example, a hospital or
a fertility clinic may be considered to be sensitive places since they are linked to a
person’s physical health. Other sensitive information that may be revealed from the
place types include hobbies, religion and beliefs, political views, sexual orientation,
physical or mental health, ethnic origin and commission of offence (as defined by the
California Location Privacy Act of 2012 1 and the Data Protection Act in the UK
2). With regards to the social dimension, sharing information about being co-located
with a particular person or a group of people may also be considered as sensitive infor-
mation, since it may reveal the nature of the relationship between individuals. Also,
sharing this information assumes an implied consent from the other people involved,
which if disputed can amount to a potential privacy breach.
3.2. The Visibility Dimension
Visibility and/or accessibility of users’ data will ultimately determine the level of
threat to personal privacy, since if the data are not exposed or can’t be accessed then
there is no question of risk to personal privacy. Smith et al. in (2011) distinguished be-
tween two types of privacy: social privacy; which refers to an individuals’ management
of self-disclosure, accessibility to their information and availability to other people,
and information privacy; which concerns controlling the accessibility to personal in-
formation, collection and exploitation by organisations and institutes. On GeoSNs,
individuals are normally able to control social privacy by setting the visibility of their
profile to either “Friends” (or “Followers”) or “Public”. In the former case, access to
the individual’s data is limited to a defined group of people, presumably known by this
1https://www.eff.org/cases/california-location-privacy-act-2012 [Accessed: 14-May-2019]
2http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/section/2 [Accessed: 14-May-2019]
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individual, while in the latter case, any user of the network can access the data. It is
not normally possible to restrict the visibility of one’s data for specific users, and thus
all users within the “Friends” group have equal rights to access the individual’s data
irrespective of their degree of association to this individual. Information privacy, on
the other hand, is usually determined by the terms, conditions and policies of handling
data in the application. To conform with GDPR, GeoSNs need to ensure that their
users are aware of what data are being collected and shared with third parties and how
the information collected will be used. However, updating a privacy policy to include
this information provides, in reality, a protection for the GeoSN against legal liability
and is not itself sufficient to ensure a user is fully informed of how their information
is processed whilst using the application.
For example, Facebook’s recently updated data policy3 indicate that they “collect
information from and about the computers, phones, connected TVs and other web-
connected devices you use that integrate with our Products, and we combine this
information across different devices that you use .. information that we obtain from
these devices includes: ..access to your GPS location, camera or photos”. However,
whilst using their Products, a user will not be aware of the amount of location tracks,
places, events, activities, and other attributes that Facebook have collected (or derived)
over time. Whilst users are able to restrict access to their precise device location,
Facebook will collect the user location through their “IP addresses and information
from your and others’ use of Facebook Products (such as check-ins or events you
attend)”. Thus, in reality users’ geo-profiling is done by default, though users living
in the EU have the opportunity to object to the processing of their data, and if their
objection is successful, have a right to request the erasure of their data under article
17(1)(c) of the GDPR.
Two levels of visibility are considered in this work: a) “Friends”; where the visibility
of the user’s profile is assumed to be restricted to a selected set of individuals or groups
of individuals who are known to the user, and b) “Public”; where the user’s profile
is open and can be accessed by any other user of the GeoSN. The latter is a special
case of information privacy where the data controllers of the GeoSN are considered as
potential adversaries. Note that on Facebook, a third category of visibility is offered;
namely “Friends of Friends”. We estimated that creating a distinct category for this
group would not be useful for our study and may confuse users, as they may not
be able to distinguish the difference between the three groups when answering the
questionnaire. For the purpose of generality and clarity, we have therefore considered
this as a special case of the Friends category.
3.3. The Awareness Dimension
When interacting with any software system, user’s attention is task oriented- they are
aware of the task they are doing instantaneously. Their awareness of the data they are
disclosing is bounded by the information needed for the task at hand. Privacy threats
become apparent with accumulated information that can be mined from implicit rela-
tionships between data items over time. For example, when a user checks into a place
at night, she may not be aware that this event can be used to deduce that this place
is probably her home. This information can be derived by clustering multiple visits in
the time dimension and analysing the frequency of visits. Awareness of the personal
data shared and stored by the application is a critical factor to the user’s perception
3https://en-gb.facebook.com/policy.php[Accessed: 14-May-2019]
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Table 1.: Independent variables considered in the experiment and the corresponding
study groups.
Realistic Attacker
Friends Public Friends Public
Spatial S1R−F S2R−P S3A−F S4A−P
Spatial-Social SS1R−F SS2R−P SS3A−F SS4A−P
Spatial-Social-Temporal SST1R−F SST2R−P SST3A−F SST4A−P
of privacy. If the user is oblivious to the data stored in her profile, she will not be able
to accurately perceive the potential risk to her privacy.
We attempt to study two modes of awareness: a) “Realistic” mode; this is the
common mode of use of a GeoSN, where people are aware only of the data they are
currently sharing and may also recall the visibility settings on their profile (i.e. whether
their interaction is shared with a specific group of people), and b) “Attacker’s” mode;
that is where the GeoSN deliberately makes the user aware of not only the data itself,
but also possible inferences that can possibly be derived by others who may have
access to the data from their current interaction. Thus the difference between the two
modes is the fact that one draws the user’s attention to the implicit conclusions that
can be drawn from their data, rather than simply the raw data itself. This increases
the user’s awareness of the privacy risks posed by a possible adversary. The latter case
is hypothetical and is not supported by any major social network platforms currently
on the market. It is envisioned as a possibility for a privacy-aware GeoSN that puts
into practice the GDPR requirements of transparency and informed consent.
4. Experiment Design
The dimensions of the location disclosure problem above are used here to guide the
design of a set of scenarios of use of a GeoSN. An experiment was carried out where
participants were asked to consider the scenarios individually before deciding on their
willingness to share their location. The participants’ sharing decisions were then used
to indicate how concerned they were about privacy when interacting on GeoSNs.
To understand the specific influence of the different aspects of the location-sharing
problem, a between-subjects design4 was adopted to examine the different study con-
ditions, namely,
(1) Data scope (Spatial (S) vs Spatial-Social (SS) vs Spatial-Social-Temporal (SST))
(2) Visibility scope (Friends vs Public)
(3) Awareness scope (Realistic vs Attacker’s).
Hence, to account for all combinations of the above, twelve treatment groups were
needed in the experiment; four groups for each of the three data scopes, as shown in
Table 1.
In each of the 12 groups, participants were asked to consider 10 scenarios of use of
a GeoSN. The scopes of visibility and awareness were then used to frame a question
which gauged their attitude to sharing location information. To understand the effect
of place sensitivity on privacy concerns, different types of place were employed in
4Between-subjects design is an experiment where two or more groups of subjects are tested each by a different
testing factor simultaneously (Wikipedia 2019).
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Table 2.: Example Scenarios across the data dimensions with different types of places.
Scenarios Spatial Spatial-Social Spatial-Social-Temporal
Insensitive
place types
You are in a Mexican
restaurant in town. You
are having dinner with a
friend. This is your first
time in this place.
You are now in a Mexican
restaurant in town. You have
been here frequently in the
past.
It is now Friday night and you are
in the Village hall in your neigh-
bourhood. You attend a drama
group every Friday night in Spring.
Sensitive
place types
You are in the Main
Hospital in Town. You
are there for your rou-
tine check-up. You vis-
ited this hospital only
once in last year.
You are now in the Main Hos-
pital in Town with Alex. You
are both visiting a friend. You
have visited this hospital only
once last year.
You are now participating in a char-
ity event in a religious centre (such
as Church, Temple, Mosque, . . . )
that you belong to. You have regu-
larly visited this place on Saturday
afternoons in the last three months.
Personal
places
You are now visiting
your friend at 16 Park
Place (an apartment
building in town). You
have not been here
previously.
You are with Alex at your
home at 16 Park Place (an
apartment building). You
have been here frequently
with Alex in the past.
You are with Alex at your home at
16 Park Place (an apartment build-
ing). He normally visits on Sunday
Evenings.
each of the 10 scenarios: 4 scenarios considered visiting public-insensitive place types
(e.g. shopping mall, cinema, fitness centre, restaurant); 5 scenarios considered visiting
public-sensitive place types (e.g. hospital, church, political party office, community
centre for a particular ethnic group); and one scenario considered visiting a personal
place (home). Table 2 shows some examples of the scenarios used in the different study
groups.
Co-location with a friend was used across scenarios to represent variation on the
social dimension. In particular, one of each scenario (sensitive and insensitive) was
set as a visit with a close friend in the SS and SST groups. In the Spatial scenarios,
no pattern of presence in a place is defined; visits are characterised as “unusual” or
“occasional”. In the Spatial-Social scenarios, a frequent pattern of presence was used
to indicate a favourite activity or a close association to a friend. In the Spatial-Social-
Temporal scenarios, regular presence, unusual visits or absence from a place were
used to infer implicit temporal association with place as well as activity and social
connection. Note that it would not have been realistic to isolate interactions on the
spatial and temporal dimensions without considering the implication on the socio-
semantic dimension. As a case in point consider the intrinsic link between the social
habits of an individual and regular Tuesday visits to a Tennis club. It would not be
possible to remove the semantic dimension from such a scenario since regularity often
implies meaning of some kind - a regular personal or social activity. To control bias, the
10 scenarios were randomly presented to participants in every group. They were not
linked to any particular real-world application. In the case of “Attacker’s” scenarios, no
reference to the purpose of using the data by the adversary was given. Participants were
left to assume how their data might be used by others. t was clear from a post-study
questionnaire, presented in Table A1 in the Appendix, that participants recognise the
presence of adversaries online and that they value their online privacy.
In the Friends scenarios, participants were asked to answer the question: “Would
you share your location now with your friends?”. Similarly, in the Public scenarios,
the question was: “Would you share your location now with other users?”. In the
Attacker’s scenarios, the question was preceded by a statement to alert the user of the
nature of information they are potentially revealing, as can be seen in the following
examples (where ’Alex’ was introduced as a close friend of the user on the social
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network application).
• (SS1R−F ) : You are now in the Main Hospital in Town with Alex. You are both
visiting a friend. You have visited this hospital only once last year. Would you
share your location now with friends?
• (SST3A−F ): It is now Saturday evening and you are in the Good Life Pub in
town. You regularly go there on Weekends. If you share your location track,
your friend connections will be able to see that you regularly go to this pub on
Weekends. Would you share your location track now with friends?
• (SST4A−F ) : It is now Saturday evening and you are in the Good Life Pub in
town. You regularly go there on Weekends. If you share your location track,
other users of the application will be able to see that you regularly go to this
pub on Weekends. Would you share your location track now with other users?
Answers to the question are mapped to perception of risk to privacy; ‘yes’ corre-
sponds to ‘unconcerned’, ‘maybe’ corresponds to ‘concerned’, and ‘no’ corresponds to
‘very concerned’. To avoid bias, no direct mention of privacy is made in the word-
ing of the questions, but participants were also able to justify their decision in an
open-ended question after completing the scenarios. The majority of responses to this
question were justifications directly related to privacy concerns (privacy, safety, sensi-
tivity, protection, etc.) (86%), while the remaining 14% also mentioned other reasons
such as social capital (what others think, interesting, useful, etc.) 5. It is noted that the
social capital concerns featured mainly in the spatial scenarios and concerns became
more privacy-oriented as more information was revealed in the scenarios.
4.1. Participants and Procedure
Participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)6. To ensure that
participants were able to relate to the presented scenarios, a qualification test for
the study was used to choose experienced MTurk workers with good reputation (have
≥ 95% approval rate for at least 500 tasks on MTurk) and who share their location from
their social network accounts. Constraints were also enforced to limit participation in
the study to only one time. The dissemination of the different versions of the study
was carried out at different times throughout the day to enable participation from
eligible workers from any country. The order of the scenarios was randomly presented
to every participant in all treatment groups.
747 participants entered the study, 32 of whom did not meet the criteria of sharing
location information on GeoSNs. The remaining 715 participants were able to complete
the survey in an average of 6.14 minutes. The number of participants in each treatment
group is shown in Table 3. The sample was young (Mean= 33.35 years old, SD= 9.88)
with an equal distribution of males and females. Most of the participants were from
North America (72.31%), with significant representation in Asia (18.04%) and Europe
(6.15%). The majority of participants use social network applications frequently (sev-
eral times a day) (69.79%). Facebook was the most used platform to share location
information, followed by Twitter, Instagram and Google+. Users of these applications
represented 95%, 55%, 53% and 41% of participants respectively. Participants also tag
5The survey and all the responses to this question can be accessed at: http://doi.org/10.17035/d.2019.
0075767525
6MTurk is a widely used online crowdsourcing platform for virtually leveraging a distributed workforce for
tasks requiring human input, such as survey participation, and is used in similar studies (Rader 2014).
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Table 3.: Number of participants in each of the study groups.
Spatial Spatial-Social Spatial-Social-Temporal
S1R−F 59 SS1R−F 60 SST1R−F 58
S2R−P 59 SS2R−P 60 SST2R−P 59
S3A−F 58 SS3A−F 59 SST3A−F 62
S4A−P 59 SS4A−P 61 SST4A−P 61
Table 4.: Average sharing decisions for participants in all study groups.
Spatial Spatial-Social Spatial-Social-Temporal
Yes Maybe No Yes Maybe No Yes Maybe No
S1R−F 56.10% 19.49% 24.41% SS1R−F 47.65% 26.74% 25.61% SST1R−F 50.09% 34.61% 28.23%
S2R−P 45.25% 27.29% 27.46% SS2R−P 40.56% 26.11% 33.33% SST2R−P 41.17% 29.87% 36.43%
S3A−F 42.59% 24.83% 32.59% SS3A−F 46.67% 26.85% 26.48% SST3A−F 44.81% 30.60% 30.24%
S4A−P 40.34% 28.98% 30.68% SS4A−P 36.07% 30.97% 32.97% SST4A−P 37.70% 23.13% 50.27%
their friends when sharing location information (always: 15.66%, sometimes: 78.74%).
22.66% of participants enable location services or other similar location features on
mobile applications frequently (always on) and 70.35% enable them moderately (when
required by an application), while only 4.48% disable such features.
A pilot study was carried out with five postgraduate students, who were tasked with
completing different versions of the study. The study and the scenarios were perceived
as easy to understand and follow. Feedback given in the post-study interview was
mainly related to improving the wording of some scenarios.
5. Results
The study involved three independent/predictor variables representing the study con-
ditions (data dimensions (Spatial, Spatial-Social or Spatial-Social-Temporal), aware-
ness (Realistic or Attacker’s), and visibility (Friends or Public)) and one depen-
dent/outcome variable representing the participants’ location-sharing decision (yes,
maybe or no). Table 4 summarises the sharing decisions among participants in each
of the study groups.
A Chi-square test of independence was used to examine the impact of the study
conditions on the participants’ attitude to privacy. Spearman’s Rank-Order Correla-
tion was also used to examine the strength and direction of the correlation (if any)
between the study conditions and participant’s perceptions. An ordinal logistic re-
gression model was adopted where the levels of the outcome variables were coded as
follows: Yes=1, Maybe=2, and No=3. To interpret the regression results, positive coef-
ficients (>0) were noted to indicate a greater likelihood of willingness to share location
(i.e. not being concerned); coefficients equal to 0 were used to indicate no additional
likelihood on top of the baseline, and negative coefficients (<0) were used to indicate
a lower likelihood of willingness to share (higher likelihood of being concerned). The
results of the model are shown in Table 5, where it can be seen that compared to
the Spatial-Social-Temporal scenarios, participants were more willing to share their
location in the Spatial-Social scenarios and even more so in the Spatial scenarios. On
the other hand, participants were less likely to share their location in the Attacker’s
scenarios compared to the Realistic scenarios and in Public scenarios compared to
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Table 5.: Results of ordinal logistic regression model examining the impact of the study
conditions on the participant’s attitude to privacy.
Condition Estimate
Odds
ratio
Std.
Error
P(Sig.)
95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Bound
Upper
Bound
Data Dimensions (baseline= Spatial-
Social-Temporal)
Dimension=Spatial .252 1.287 .054 <.0001 .147 .358
Dimension=Spatial-Social .151 1.163 .055 .006 .043 .259
Visibility (baseline=Public)
Visibility=Friends .320 1.378 .045 <.0001 .233 .408
Awareness (baseline=Realistic)
Awareness=Attackers’ View -.217 .805 .045 <.0001 -.305 -.129
Friends.
All the study conditions; data dimensions, visibility and awareness of location-
sharing activities were shown to significantly impact the participants’ privacy per-
ceptions (p<.0001). In particular, visibility was the factor with the strongest impact
on privacy perception followed the awareness and data scopes. It is interesting to note
that place sensitivity and co-location with a friend have also been shown to signif-
icantly influence the participants’ privacy attitude. The sensitivity of place reduced
the participants’ willingness to share by 31% while co-location with a friend reduced
it by 8%. A more detailed analysis of the results is given below.
5.1. Impact of the Data Dimensions
The data dimensions were shown to have a statistically significant impact on users’
willingness to share their location (Pearson Chi-Square= 22.72, p<0.0001). A moder-
ately positive correlation between the data dimensions and the participants’ attitude
to sharing their information was noted (Spearman’s rho=0.53, p<0.0001). Hence, users
tend to become more concerned about their location privacy as the information shared
becomes more complex along the different data dimensions. Participants in the Spa-
tial study groups were the least concerned about their privacy (maybe 25.1%:, no:
28.8%), compared to the Spatial-Social groups (maybe 27.7%:, no: 29.6%) and the
Spatial-Social-Temporal groups (maybe 27%:, no: 33.2%).
Responses to the open-ended question revealed increasingly more privacy as well
as safety concerns as more data dimensions are revealed. Example responses from
the Spatial-Social-Temporal groups refer to fears of tracking by others: the fear that
“someone... could track you and get to you if they wanted to” and being “concerned
about... safety. Some people could see the pattern of my whereabouts, and use that
information to stalk me or my friend”.“Because there are some places you just do
not need to let others know [the location of]... These days people could try to come to
your home and rape you, murder you, or even kidnap you”. Some responses showed
awareness of absence inference from location tracks, e.g. “Sharing my location... on a
regular basis advertises that I am not at home on those days and times” and “I would
not let anyone know where I go on a regular basis. This is a good way to have your
home robbed”.
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5.1.1. Impact of Place Sensitivity
Observing the sensitivity of place across all the data dimensions has shown that it has
a statistically significant effect on users’ willingness to share their information (Pearson
Chi-Square= 729.903, p<0.0001). As can be expected, participants were most likely
to share their location in public-insensitive place types (Yes: 58.4%). Their willingness
to share decreases significantly, by 31%, in personal places (Yes: 27.4%) and to a large
degree (by 25%) in other sensitive place types (Yes: 33.2%).
Reluctance to share personal location in sensitive places was explained in responses
to open-ended questions, for example, it was said that “Sharing location information
for public places is mostly OK... but sharing personal location information related to
religion, political affiliation or a friend’s house via location info is something I try not
to do” and that one “wouldn’t want to share medical location places or anything having
to do with my culture, faith or home. Those are private issues”. Figure 1 shows the
sharing decisions across the sensitive and personal place types.
Figure 1.: Sharing decisions in sensitive and personal places.
5.1.2. Impact of co-location with Friends
Co-location with a friend was also shown to have a statistically significant effect on
the participants’ willingness to share their location (Pearson Chi-Square= 46.363,
p<0.0001). Participants were less likely to share their location if they are with a
friend than when being at a place by themselves (Yes = 46% when alone compared to
38% when with a friend).
Some reasons for the sharing attitude are explained by participants to be mainly
due to considering the information as sensitive or that it involves someone else whose
privacy should be considered, as shown in the following comments: “To protect the
privacy of other people I was with or visiting” and “if I do tag friends, I like to ask
permission from them first”.
5.2. Impact of the Visibility Scope
The visibility scope of the user profile in location-sharing scenarios has a statistically
significant impact on the users’ likelihood to disclose their location (Pearson Chi-
Square= 50.204, p<0.0001). A strong positive correlation is noted between the partic-
ipants’ privacy attitude and the visibility of their information (Spearman’s rho=0.85,
p<0.0001). This suggests that participants are less likely to share their location if their
profile was Public than if it was set to be visible by Friends only, as indeed confirmed
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in the results (34% said No to sharing with Public compared to 27% with Friends).
Participants who were reluctant to disclose their location with other users justified
their attitude by referring to their desire to protect their privacy, e.g. “I didn’t want
to disclose my location for strangers to know”, “I don’t want people to know where I
am or potentially stalk me” and “Some occasions seem too personal to share with the
public”.
Figure 2 shows the combined results for the data dimensions and the visibility. As
shown in the figure, participants are most willing to share their locations in the SF
scenarios (Yes: 49.34%), while they are mostly unwilling to share their location in
the SSTP scenarios (No: 40%). The impact of the visibility scope is evident in the
figure, where the difference in the sharing decisions is more pronounced in the Public
scenarios, as was indicated in the participants’ responses: “I am not comfortable with
strangers having access to my address and access to my routines”.
Figure 2.: Sharing decisions categorised by visibility scope and data dimensions.
5.3. Impact of Awareness
Users’ awareness of implications of their sharing decisions has a statistically signifi-
cant impact on the likelihood of them disclosing their location (Pearson Chi-Square=
23.340, p<0.0001). A fairly strong positive correlation is noted between the partici-
pants’ privacy attitude and their awareness (Spearman’s rho=0.58, p<0.0001). This
suggests that participants are less likely to share their location if they were made aware
of the nature of their disclosed information and its possible implications.
Justification for the sharing decision highlighted users’ awareness of the privacy
implications and their need to control their privacy, e.g. “I wouldn’t want to broadcast
my history of the place”, “I didn’t want to be tracked in sensitive areas” and “I don’t
want to be tracked and I don’t want someone to notice patterns [in] where I go”.
Being mindful of the sensitivity of the places visited triggered a reaction to question
their sharing behaviour (often due to users’ personal affiliations with particular types
of place); “I prefer to keep certain things private - politics, health info, and any other
information that could be used to deduce other things I prefer to keep private”, “No one
needs to know I go to church on Sundays for example”, and “Sharing some locations
would allow other users (who I may not want to share that data with) to interpret or
assume things about me that I would not necessarily want to be public knowledge”.
Figure 3(a) shows the effect of the awareness factor grouped by the data dimension,
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and in (b) the effect is grouped by the visibility scope. Participants are most willing
to share their locations in the SR groups (Yes:50.68%) and are least willing to share
their data in the SSTA groups (No: 37%). The impact of the visibility scope is evident
in Figure 3, where the differences in the sharing decisions are more pronounced in the
Public scenarios, as was indicated in the participants’ responses: “I am not comfortable
with strangers having access to my address and access to my routines”.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.: Sharing decisions grouped by a) data dimensions and awareness conditions
and b) visibility scope and awareness conditions.
Exploration of the relationships between all study conditions in terms of their mu-
tual impact on users’ privacy perceptions reveals that the participants most likely to
share their location are those presented with SR−F scenarios (Yes: 56.10%), followed by
those in SSTR−F and SSR−F (Yes:50% and 48% respectively). This observation sug-
gests that participants were least concerned about their location privacy when sharing
with friends in realistic experience and the extracted information is at minimum (data
dimension=Spatial), and their concern increases when more personal information are
revealed. On the contrary, participants were least willing to disclose their location in
SSTA−P scenarios (No: 50.27%), followed by SSA−P and SA−P scenarios (No: 33%
and 31% respectively).
5.4. Discussion
The validity of this study was carefully considered. The use of hypothetical location-
sharing scenarios has been shown to be an effective approach for yielding generalisable
outcomes in a number of previous studies (e.g. (Patil et al. 2014, Tang et al. 2011)).
Using this approach has the advantage of removing the association and dependence on
a specific GeoSN and hence reducing the effects of particular interface and interaction
modes offered within those applications, whilst also offering the opportunity of admin-
stration to large samples of users. Bias was limited by careful choice of participants,
using a between-subjects design and the random order of presentation of the scenarios
in all study groups.
The scenarios were developed in a consistent manner to cover all the variables of
interest, whilst at the same time enabling the participants to be immersed to a large
degree in the location-sharing experience. This was evident in the participants’ re-
sponses to the open-ended questions. For example, they would refer to themselves:
“When I was in a political meeting, I would not share my location without the per-
mission of others or the party” and “I answered maybe or no to places that I frequent
because someone might see a pattern”. They also referred to personal experiences: “I
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have a friend that checked in everywhere she went. Her profile was public so anyone
could see it. Her house was burglarized twice in one month because everyone knew she
wasn’t home.” and “I started to think about how if it was a regular routine that I was
somewhere on a specific night, it was going to give other people potentially too much
information about my habits and whereabouts”.
We collected demographics data on age, gender and nationality only. An analysis
of the effect of these attributes on the sharing decisions is given in the Appendix. The
trends noted there may prove useful in the design of future studies. Several points
regarding the impact of personal characteristics on sharing decisions are noted below,
that would also be useful to consider in more detail in future work.
(1) It can be argued that people’s attitude to location privacy is unique and de-
pends on personal characteristics, such as religious belief or political affiliation.
For example, a religious person may not wish to expose her presence in a place of
worship. A person living in a city may have a stronger sense of location privacy
compared to someone living in a small village in the countryside. This argu-
ment was supported to some degree in the responses to the open-ended question
reported above. Ideally, we could have tailored the scenarios related to some
of the sensitive place types to the particular characteristics of the participants.
Such personalised tailoring of the questions was difficult to perform in a widely
disseminated online study such as this. A more in-depth study is needed in the
future that can control and measure the effect of such personal attributes on the
perception of risk to location privacy.
(2) Similarly, culture may play a role in people’s attitude to online interaction. This
study didn’t probe or limit the scope of the origin of participants beyond record-
ing their nationality, although several participants made reference to culturally
specific privacy concerns such as religion in the open-ended responses.
(3) The study didn’t control for the factor of prior adverse experience with privacy
(Trepte et al. 2014). The importance of this factor is becoming evident as more
people become involved or become aware of negative privacy experiences. A more
in-depth study of the effects of this factor is needed in future work.
In what follows the results of the experiment are used to guide a model of perception
of risk to personal privacy on GeoSNs.
6. A Model of Privacy Risks of Location Sharing on GeoSNs
As has been found in previous studies (Kumaraguru and Cranor 2005), a large pro-
portion of people can be considered to be privacy pragmatists who are willing to share
their data if they see tangible benefits for doing so, but are also very concerned about
protecting themselves from the abuse and misuse of their personal information. In this
section, we use the results of the analysis above to inform the derivation of a model of
user’s perception of risk when sharing their location on GeoSNs. To facilitate its com-
prehension, a traffic light metaphor is used here to represent the level of risk: Green
= Unconcerned, Amber = Concerned and Red = Very concerned. We can map this
classification to the Westin and Harris privacy scale (Kumaraguru and Cranor 2005):
Green = Privacy unconcerned, Amber = Privacy Pragmatists and Red = Privacy
Fundamentalist and observe how they correspond to one another. A colour-coded pri-
vacy notice design is also desirable due to its simplicity and universality. The colours
will range from red (the information is revealing and may not be safe to disclose),
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Table 6.: Sharing decisions classified by the sensitivity of place types in the Realistic
awareness scenarios.
Visibility Friends Public
Data Dimension Sensitivity Yes Maybe No Yes Maybe No
Spatial
Insensitive 73% 18% 9% 67% 26% 7%
Sensitive 45% 21% 34% 31% 28% 41%
Spatial-Social
Insensitive 67% 23% 10% 60% 24% 16%
Sensitive 32% 30% 38% 25% 28% 47%
Spatial-Social-Temporal
Insensitive 57% 30% 13% 49% 31% 20%
Sensitive 36% 31% 33% 31% 26% 43%
Table 7.: Sharing decisions classified by the sensitivity of place types in the Attacker’s
awareness scenarios.
Visibility Friends Public
Data Dimension Sensitivity Yes Maybe No Yes Maybe No
Spatial
Insensitive 61% 23% 16% 55% 32% 13%
Sensitive 30% 26% 44% 31% 27% 42%
Spatial-Social
Insensitive 57% 25% 18% 55% 32% 13%
Sensitive 38% 28% 34% 21% 30% 49%
Spatial-Social-Temporal
Insensitive 52% 32% 16% 48% 28% 25%
Sensitive 36% 27% 37% 25% 16% 59%
through to amber (one may need to exercise caution when disclosing this information)
and ultimately green (information that may be safely disclosed). Participants’ sharing
decisions based on the variables used in the study are presented in Table 6 for the
Realistic scenarios and in Table 7 for the Attacker’s scenarios. Figure 4 shows the
mapping of this data using the traffic light metaphor in both states of awareness.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.: A mapping of sharing decisions to three privacy risk levels in the case of
(a)Realistic and (b) Attacker’s mode of awareness.
Given the responses, we wish to produce a model which bases its decisions on the
shareability of data on user feedback. One way of doing this is to produce a relative
scale where the upper and lower limits are defined by the upper and lower limits of the
data itself. In Table 8, the responses were reclassified to only two categories ’Yes’ and
’No’. The ’Maybe’ responses were evenly distributed between these two categories.
The threshold values were computed by considering the most vulnerable and least
vulnerable privacy groups according to the revised percentage of ’Yes’ Responses.
The situation with the largest percentage of Yes responses is Spa-
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Table 8.: Sharing decisions with only two groups of responses; ’Yes’ and ’No’.
Awareness Realistic Attacker’s view
Visibility Friends Public Friends Public
Data
Dimensions
Sensitivity Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Spatial
Insensitive 82% 18% 80% 20% 72.5% 27.5% 71% 29%
Sensitive 55.5% 44.5% 45% 55% 43% 57% 44.5% 55.5%
Spatial-Social
Insensitive 78.5% 21.5% 72% 28% 69.5% 30.5% 71% 29%
Sensitive 47% 53% 39% 61% 52% 48%, 36% 64%
Spatial-Social
-Temporal
Insensitive 72% 28% 64.5% 35.5% 68% 26% 62% 39%
Sensitive 51 % 49% 44% 56% 49.5% 50.5% 33% 67%
tial:Insensitive:Friends:Realistic as seen in Table 8, with Yes = 82%. On the other hand,
the situation with the smallest percentage of Yes responses (equivalently, the largest
percentage of No responses) was Spatial-Social-Temporal:Sensitive:Public:Attacker’s
with Yes = 33% (both highlighted in Table 8). Semantically, we can take these groups
to represent the “safest” and “least safe” situations as judged by the respondents.
We propose a so-called Vulnerability Index (VI) which will be defined as a relative
percentage, using the above percentages as upper and lower bounds respectively. A
Yes percentage at or above the upper threshold of Yes = 82% will be capped at a VI
of 100%, and a percentage equal to or below the lower threshold of Yes = 33% will
be capped at a VI of 0%. Mathematically, the function is as follows, where x is the
percentage of Yes responses:
V I(x) =



100, 82<x 6 100
F (x), 33 6 x 6 82
0, 0 6 x<33
.
We note that F (x) might be any function and its shape will determine the nature
of our privacy recommendations. For example, by biasing the function against lower
values, we can be more conservative in our recommendations. As a starting point and
a useful illustration, a simple, linear F (x) might be as follows:
F (x) =
x− 33
82− 33
× 100 =
x− 33
49
× 100 (1)
The output of the above function V I(x), with F (x) as in Equation 1, can be interpreted
as the degree to which a particular situation’s responses tend towards one of the
measured extremes.
To generate a traffic light colour, we used the RGB colour scheme, which composes a
colour from three colour values: Red, Green and Blue. The formulae below are designed
to give a linear variation in colour between entirely Red at V I = 0 : RGB(255, 0, 0);
and entirely Green at V I = 100 : RGB(0, 255, 0). At V I = 50, we have equal measures
of Red and Green giving yellow: RGB(255, 255, 0).
R =
{
255, 0<V I 6 50
(1− V I−50
50
)× 255, 50 6 V I 6 100
.
G =
{
255, 50<V I 6 100
(1− 50−V I
50
)× 255, 0 6 V I 6 50
.
Table 9 uses the traffic light model to present the data from Table 8 with the original
Yes responses, while Table 10 presents the results using the Vulnerability Indexes.
Table 11 presents a different view of the model that combines both the Realistic and
Attacker’s views and assigns definite risk levels to all groups according to the average
of the Vulnerability Index along the Awareness dimension. The average Vulnerability
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Table 9.: A proposed model of risk levels based on the proportion of sharing decisions.
The percentage of Yes responses is given. The colour is generated from the Vulnera-
bility Index, ranging from red to green.
Awareness Realistic Attacker’s view
Visibility
Friends Public Friends Public
Data Dimension Sensitivity
Spatial
Insensitive 82 80 72.5 71
Sensitive 55.5 45 43 44.5
Spatial-Social
Insensitive 78.5 72 69.5 71
Sensitive 47 39 52 36
Spatial-Social
-Temporal
Insensitive 72 64.5 68 62
Sensitive 51 44 49.5 33
Table 10.: The Vulnerability Indexes for each scenario. The associated traffic light
colours ranging from red to green are shown.
Awareness Realistic Attacker’s view
Visibility
Friends Public Friends Public
Data Dimension Sensitivity
Spatial
Insensitive 100 95.92 80.61 77.55
Sensitive 45.91 24.49 20.41 23.47
Spatial-Social
Insensitive 92.86 79.59 74.49 77.55
Sensitive 28.57 12.24 38.78 6.12
Spatial-Social
-Temporal
Insensitive 79.59 64.29 71.43 59.18
Sensitive 36.73 22.45 33.67 0
Table 11.: A revised risk model with colours dictated by the Vulnerability Indexes in
Table 9 averaged along the Awareness dimension.
Friends Public
Insensitive Sensitive Insensitive Sensitive
Spatial 90.31 33.16 86.73 23.98
Spatial-Social 83.67 33.67 78.57 9.18
Spatial-Social-Temporal 75.51 35.20 61.73 11.22
Index is then shown shaded in the corresponding traffic light colour. The average
Vulnerability Index (VI) over all dimensions (data, visibility and awareness) was 51.91.
This is almost exactly halfway between the defined maximum (100) and the defined
minimum (0). This is an indication that our linear F (x) used for interpolation between
the maximum and the minimum (shown in Equation 1) results in a Vulnerability Index
with values which are evenly spread over the scale. A VI of 51.91 corresponds to an
amber traffic light colour, which when mapped to the Westin and Harris scale indicates
that users of GeoSNs are on average privacy pragmatists who are willing to share their
location information, but need to be supported by the applications to ensure that their
data are protected from misuse or abuse.
Table 11 presents a possible model of interpreting users’ perception of privacy risk
when disclosing location information. The model can be used by GeoSNs to improve
users’ awareness of their sharing behaviour. Based on the information collected in the
user profiles, the application can predict a level of risk for future sharing decisions
and alert the user as appropriate. The colour can be used to indicate to the user in
a simple manner the extent to which the item they are sharing poses a privacy risk.
The visual interpretation in the form of traffic light colours is just one such method.
Another simple example would be to map the VI to a point on a scale from 1 to 10.
Privacy perception is ultimately a personal variable, however, the above derived risk
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models present a baseline; an indication of sharing behaviour of majority of users on
the GeoSN, against which individual user’s behaviour can be compared. Ultimately,
the application would be able to learn from the individual’s behaviour and adjust the
model to suit.
From both tables, it can be seen that the sensitivity of place plays a major role in
perception of risk on GeoSNs, where users are mostly willing to share their location
when visiting insensitive places. A simple method of enhancing privacy in GeoSNs can
therefore focus on sensitive places for users. These places can be identified by the user
manually or can be automatically identified from their location tracks. The application
can then alert the user mainly when sharing information whilst visiting those places.
7. Conclusions
This paper presented a data-oriented approach to understanding users’ perception of
threat to privacy on GeoSNs and proposes a model of privacy risks that is derived
from studying collective users’ attitude to sharing data on GeoSNs. Aspects of the
problem have been identified, namely, data, visibility and awareness. Data disclosed
by sharing location information vary within a space defined by the spatial, temporal
and socio-semantic dimensions. In addition, the sensitivity of the places visited as
well as co-location with others were identified as contributing factors to privacy risks.
An experiment has been designed to assess the effect of these variables on the privacy
perception of GeoSN users. Perception of risk was noted to increase as the information
content in the data disclosed increased; whether with the data dimension, or with place
sensitivity and co-location with other people. Visibility of the information was shown
to have the most significant impact on privacy perception, where users were more
comfortable sharing their information with ‘Friends‘ (as defined by connections made
on social web applications). Making the user aware of the nature of the information
they are sharing was seen to have a significant impact on their sharing behaviour.
This indicates that users’ awareness is limited when interacting on GeoSNs and thus
questions their presumed consent of use of the applications.
The study involved 715 participants split into 12 groups to study the different
identified variables. Results from the study were used to define a simple model of
privacy risk on GeoSNs. The model shows that in the majority of cases, users can be
considered privacy pragmatists who are willing to share their data if they see tangible
benefits for doing so, but are also very concerned about protecting themselves from
the abuse and misuse of their personal information. GeoSNs can employ such a model
to design privacy notification systems to alert the users to possible consequences of
sharing information, thus allowing the user to take control of their sharing behaviour
and ultimately increasing the trust in the application. These privacy notifications can
be deduced from relative measures, such as the proposed Vulnerability Index, and
visualised in ways which are easy to understand, for example a traffic light scale.
Future work will consider the utility of the proposed model in designing privacy-
aware GeoSNs and the possible effects of different models of connection on online social
networks, e.g. Friends of Friends. Usability of the designs will need to be considered
along with a study of cost-benefit analysis of employing such models in GeoSNs.
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Appendix A. Effect of Gender, Age and Nationality
To consider whether the demographics of participants has any effect on the sharing de-
cision, we separated the impact of the dimensions from the demographic by averaging
the responses of participants for all scenarios and grouping them based on demograph-
ics alone. This gives an insight into the degree to which sharing decisions are influenced
by age, gender and nationality, as shown in Figure A1. There is clearly a correlation
between the sharing decision of participants and their age (p < 0.0001), with younger
participants more likely to share. The decision to share is also strongly influenced by
gender (p < 0.00001), with male participants being much more likely to share. Finally,
the nationality of participants also had a significant impact (p < 0.00001) with partic-
ipants from Asia and Southern America being more prone to sharing, but European
and North American participants showing no strong trend either way.
22
Sharing Decisions by Age
Maybe No Yes
Response
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 A
v
e
ra
g
e
Young (18-29)
Older (29-36)
Oldest (36-79)
(a)
Sharing Decisions by Gender
Maybe No Yes
Response
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 D
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
 f
ro
m
 A
v
e
ra
g
e
Female
Male
(b)
Sharing Decisions by Nationality
Maybe No Yes
Response
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
D
ev
ia
tio
n 
fr
om
 A
ve
ra
ge
Asia
Europe
North America
South America
(c)
Figure A1.: Effect of gender, age and nationality on sharing decisions. In the case of
nationality, Australian and African groups were excluded due to the small sample size
(fewer than 30 responses total each).
A.1. Post-study questionnaire
A post-study questionnaire, based on the privacy scales proposed in (Rader 2014) was
used to gauge how participants value their online privacy. Participants were presented
with six statements with a 5-point Likert scale (strongly disagree (1)/strongly agree
(5)). The results are shown in Table A1. The first two statements were negatively
framed and the rest were positively framed to avoid bias. The average score for each
statement was recorded. The overall average score for all statements was 3.845 with a
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.703, indicating a high degree of consistency in the results.
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Table A1.: Post-study questionnaire on the value of personal privacy online.
Statement Average SD
I am not concerned that companies are collecting too much personal infor-
mation about me.
2.456 1.2
It usually does not bother me when companies ask me for personal informa-
tion.
2.641 1.17
When people give personal information to a company for some reason, the
company should never use the information for any other reason.
4.357 0.92
I have limited the personal information that I post to my social networks’
accounts.
3.869 1
I don’t post to my social networks’ accounts about certain topics because I
worry who has access.
3.807 1.14
If I think that information (including location) I posted to my social networks’
accounts really looks too private, I might delete it.
4.134 1.04
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